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CERTIFICATION AND INSPECTION: AN
OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY*
MARK A. DOMBROFF**
I. INTRODUCTION
THE AREAS ENCOMPASSED by the federal
government's certification and inspection process are nu-
merous. They include, among others, aircraft, automobiles,
trains, boats, mines, banks, drugs, energy and consumer items.
Each of these has either been the subject of litigation in the
past or is presently the object of a courtroom battle. While
they are disparate in nature, the legal principles controlling
the federal government's inspection and certification involve-
ment in each are similar.
II. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
The federal government issues countless licenses, permits
and certificates each year. These permits authorize private
persons to manufacture products and perform a host of other
* This article is a chapter in: The Trial of a Product Liability Lawsuit. (V.
Walkowiak ed. 1981), published by Matthew Bender & Co. It is reprinted with
permission.
** Director, Torts Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
Admitted to practice in the District of Columbia and Maryland; Chairman, Demon-
strative Evidence Subcommittee, Trial Evidence Committee, Litigation Section,
American Bar Association; Advisor, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Southern
Methodist University School of Law.
The material contained herein represents the views of the author and not necessa-
rily those of the Department of Justice.
The author is indebted to Ms. Cecile Hatfield, an attorney with the Torts Branch,
Civil Division, Department of Justice, for her research on important product certifica-
tion cases which forms the basis for much of this article. The author acknowledges
her fine work.
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activities. In virtually every case, it is possible that the manu-
facturer may commit an act of negligence. To allow every in-
jured party to seek recovery, not just against the manufac-
turer whose negligence caused the injury, but against the
federal government would make the government an insurer of
the conduct of every private manufacturer. The Supreme
Court has held that such a result is impermissible.'
An ideal context within which to examine the federal gov-
ernment's certification and inspection functions in the prod-
uct area is in the field of aviation. Since the federal govern-
ment, through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
inspects and certifies aircraft manufacturers, aircraft compo-
nents, airports, pilots and navigational aids, an examination of
this area in some detail will provide a useful context for dis-
cussing the Government's role as an inspector and certifier in
the marketplace.
The function of the United States in the manufacture of
aircraft is to provide minimum standards and to determine
compliance by the manufacturer with those standards. The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958,1 (the Act), provides for the de-
velopment of a comprehensive regulatory system to promote
aviation safety. The Act authorizes the FAA to regulate the
aviation industry by establishing minimum safety standards,8
not unlike parallel legislation in other areas involving govern-
ment inspection or certification activities.
The Act also gives the Administrator of the FAA extensive
discretion to promulgate regulations and issue orders and to
perform acts as "he shall deem necessary" to exercise and per-
form his powers and duties under the Act.' As part of his gen-
eral safety power, the Administrator may prescribe minimum
standards governing the design, materials, workmanship, con-
struction and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines and
propellers as may be required in the interest of safety.'
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1976).
49 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1354(a) (1976).
49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1976).
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FAA certification is a multi-tiered process. First, a manu-
facturer must obtain a Type Certificate by submitting
blueprints and design drawings of the type design of the air-
craft.' Next, the manufacturer must obtain a Production Cer-
tificate based on his ability to establish conformity of produc-
tion models with the "Type" or prototype. After manufacture
of production models, and upon final assembly and distribu-
tion of the aircraft, the last stage of the certification process is
the issuance of the Airworthiness Certificate.8 The Airworthi-
ness Certificate is issued when the Administrator finds that
the aircraft conforms to its Type Certificate and is in condi-
tion for safe operation. Should a major change in the aircraft's
design be desired, so that it no longer conforms to the type
design approved in the Type Certificate(s), a Supplemental
Type Certificate must be obtained.9
The certification process thus requires that the manufac-
turer-applicant initially submit such design and performance
data as the Administrator deems necessary to determine that
the design of an aircraft meets the minimum standards
promulgated by the FAA. Upon evaluation of the manufac-
turer's data, the Adminstrator or the person to whom he has
delegated his authority to certify, makes a final determination
as to whether an applicant has sufficiently complied with reg-
ulatory minimum safety standards to receive a license. This
determination is based both on objective and subjective
criteria.
Certification is essentially an adjudicatory process, in which
the government makes a determination of eligibility based
upon a factual presentation by the applicant. While such an
adjudicative determination might be reviewable under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act for abuse of discretion, such an
abuse of discretion is excepted from liability under section
2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act 10 which provides that:
O 49 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1976).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1976).
B 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1976).
9 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1981).
,o 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). Cf. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d
941 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 (1976) (disappointed bidder sought to
1982]
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Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
Many government agencies are charged by statute with a
"duty" to conduct inspections, issue licenses and investigate
or enforce some aspect of federal law.12 Nevertheless, whether
the asserted duty is created by statute or regulation, courts
have consistently refused to impose an actionable duty upon
such agencies' regulatory functions such as inspection, licens-
ing or enforcement. Whether based upon the absence of a le-
gal duty, the exercise of non-actionable executive discretion or
a non-actionable misrepresentation, courts have held the fed-
eral government not to be liable for negligence in such
activities."1
In In re Franklin National Bank,1" the district court
granted the government's renewed motion for summary judg-
ment on behalf of the Comptroller of the Currency in the liti-
gation surrounding the failure of the twentieth largest bank in
the United States. Plaintiffs had sought to hold the United
States liable for damages arising out of the bank failure based
on federal regulatory enforcement responsibility for the bank.
It was argued that the failure to detect the weakness and dis-
allege tort claims against FAA when contract awarded to another).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
II E.g., Federal Aviation Administration, Food & Drug Administration, Federal De-
posit Insurance Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission.
13 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Clemente v. United States, 567
F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 522 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1977); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536
(1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); Davis v. United States, 536 F.2d 758
(8th Cir. 1976); J. H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d 110 (9th Cir.
1959); Sellfors v. United States, 16 Av. Cas. 17,186 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1980); In re
Franklin Nat'l Bank, 478 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Eckles v. United States, 471
F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977); Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
" 478 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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honesty in the Franklin National Bank during the govern-
ment's inspections and audits breached actionable duties that
flowed to the shareholders of the bank. Rejecting these argu-
ments, the court held that the inspector's failure to detect
weaknesses or dishonesty at an examined bank gave rise to no
cause of action against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.15
In Illinois v. Maryland Casualty Co.,1 state department of
health employees insured, through inspections and testing,
that water was adequately and properly treated. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that such obligation, for pur-
poses of imposing tort liability, constituted a public duty, not
a duty owed to any particular person.
In the case of In re Pago Pago Air Crash Disaster of Janu-
ary 30, 1974, the court held:
The general statutory language [referring to The Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq.] empowers the
F.A.A. to promulgate regulations to assure air safety, but there
is nothing in the statutory scheme that creates a duty to the
public to inspect the airlines, and would create a duty and in
effect, create a cause of action against the Government for fail-
ure to inspect the airlines.18
The First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Clemente v.
United States,1 9 illustrates the manner in which some courts
have approached the question of determining the existence of
an actionable duty. Clemente involved a suit brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act,'0 for an aircraft accident. The
plaintiffs alleged a failure on the part of the United States to
inspect, investigate and prosecute violations of safety regula-
tions. The court held as follows:
Not all acts and orders of the United States government are so
,5 Id. at 215.
-6 132 F.2d 850, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1942).
17 No. 176 (J.P.M.D.L.) (United States' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment de-
cided Jan. 6, 1978).
is Id.
19 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
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sovereign that they must be treated as commands which create
legal duties or standards, the violation of which involves break-
ing the law. A considerable part of the government's conduct is
in the context of an employer-employee relationship, a rela-
tionship which includes reciprocal duties between the govern-
ment and its staff, but not necessarily a legal duty to the
citizenry.
Even assuming, as plaintiffs contend, that this [internal
FAA] order was mandatory, the duty it creates is that of the
District Office employees to perform their jobs in a certain way
as directed by their superiors. [Such a duty] is owed by the
employees to the government and is totally distinguishable
from a duty owed by the government to the public on which
liability could be based. The failure to perform the order may
be grounds for internal discipline, but it does not follow that
such conduct necessarily constitutes the kind of breach cogni-
zable by tort law.21
In United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States,22 the
Ninth Circuit addressed the problem of whether the United
States negligently inspected and certified an aircraft. The
court held that "[flack of due care in effecting the execution
of a bond by another obviously is not a common-law tort;
neither, it would seem, is the simple failure to inspect an-
other's vehicles or machinery, or the failure to do so with due
care."
23
A similar result was reached in Mercer v. United States,2 '
which involved alleged negligent inspection and enforcement
activities under the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine
Safety Act." The court stated:
A federal inspector assumes no responsibility to maintain com-
pliance with safety standards upon which either the mine oper-
ators or their employees can rely. The responsibility remains
with the operator and is not shifted to the inspector by the act
567 F.2d at 1144-45.
22 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
2" 614 F.2d at 193.
, 460 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 721-740 (1976).
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of undertaking an inspection.2
In another regulatory function case brought under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, Carroll v. United States,"' a miner who
was severely injured in an accident, alleged that the United
States' inspectors either negligently failed to inspect the ma-
chinery in question or inspected it in a negligent manner.
Their failure to detect the defective conditions was alleged to
be the cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Ruling from the bench, the court held that neither the Fed-
eral Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, nor the law of
Idaho, created a duty actionable in tort, running against the
government for alleged negligence in the inspection of mines,
conducted by government inspectors. The court, citing a
Ninth Circuit case, Roberson v. United States,2" held that the
mere conduct of regulatory enforcement inspectors in deter-
mining compliance with safety standards does not create a
duty in tort of the United States.
In Rayford v. United States,"9 the district court declined to
find any actionable duty in the inspection and approval of a
highway design. The court pointed out that cases in which the
United States has been liable involve situations "of a direct
operational nature (such as air traffic control, firefighting,
buoy tending, and lighthouse operation)."30 The passive role
of inspection and approval of a highway design was held to be
an insufficient basis for liability.8 '
The district court in Kirk v. United States,"2 emphasized
26 460 F. Supp. at 332.
2 488 F. Supp. 757 (D. Idaho 1980).
I8 382 F.2d 714, 719-22 (9th Cir. 1967) (action to recover damages for personal inju-
ries sustained when workmen fell while engaged in construction work at federal dam
project).
29 410 F. Supp. 1051 (M.D. Tenn. 1976).
00 Id. at 1052 (emphasis by the court).
3, See Daniel v. United States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970) (federal approval of
design plans for highway construction does not give rise to a cause of action for negli-
gent design against the United States); Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962) (federal statutes relating to the inspection of
highways does not create a duty on the part of the United States); Delgadillo v. El-
ledge, 337 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (federal approval of highway projects and
inspection of highways does not render United States liable for injuries to motorists).
32 61 F. Supp. 722 (D. Idaho 1958).
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that a regulatory statute which, imposed a duty on the Secre-
tary of the Army to establish and supervise a program of river
improvement and flood control, did not expose the govern-
ment to civil liability for the death of a dam project construc-
tion worker, absent the express or implied approval of Con-
gress. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the
district court, stating that the statute at bar created no legal
duty on the part of the United States toward the construction
worker. The circuit court also held that regulations authorized
by the statute did not create a legal duty to individuals, rea-
soning that:
Every government employee must trace the duties of his job to
some law, regulation, or order, but this does not mean that in
every such case there is thereby established a duty of care on
the part of the employee and the government toward those
who may be incidentally benefited if those duties are properly
performed or toward those who may be incidentally injured if
those duties are not properly performed.8
Use of the federal regulations as a standard of care to which
government agencies must be held, would be tantamount to
holding the United States liable whenever a private person
fails to fulfill his obligation under the regulations. This inter-
pretation would generate a result clearly not intended by Con-
gress, because the federal government would become an in-
surer, albeit in the context of a tort action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Such a result is impermissible since the gov-
ernment is not held to a standard of strict liability."'
It would not be sound public policy to shift the financial
responsibility for such accidents to the United States merely
because Congress has sought to improve safety by enacting
statutes which impose some minimum standards and provide
for federal inspections and certifications, in an attempt to ob-
tain compliance with those standards. The issue truly
presented by these situations is whether a duty, actionable in
33 270 F.2d 110, 118 (9th Cir. 1959) (emphasis added).
" Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (language of FTCA specifically permits im-
position of liability upon Government only when conduct is negligent or involves
some other form of misfeasance or nonfeasance).
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tort can be imposed upon the United States for carrying out
its regulatory functions of inspecting and certifying products
or activities.
III. NEITHER FEDERAL LAW NOR STATE LAW CREATES ANY
DUTY
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is a limited waiver of
the sovereign immunity historically enjoyed by the Govern-
ment."' The United States may be found liable only in the
manner and to the degree to which it has consented.a6 More-
over, certain categories of torts are excluded from coverage by
Section 2680 of the FTCA." Due regard must be given to
these exceptions, because courts lack jurisdiction to entertain
an excluded claim.38
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States has
expressly limited its waiver of sovereign immunity to claims
for negligence arising under "circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 9 A prospective plaintiff must establish initially
that the United States, if treated as a private person, would
owe a duty of care to plaintiffs under the law of the state in
question. In Feres v. United States," the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not
create new causes of action, but merely enables the federal
government to accept liability under circumstances that would
impose it on private individuals in similar or analogous
" See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
" Wright v. United States, 568 F.2d 153, 158 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978).
'" See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) .(1976) (creates the discretionary function defense);
id. § 2680(h) (excludes, among other things, claims arising out of misrepresentations);
id. § 2680(k) (excludes foreign torts).
" Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24, 31 n.25 (1953); First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 552 F.2d 370, 374 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1978);
Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 876 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (emphasis added). See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976), which
is similar to § 1346(b), in that the liability of the United States is equivalent to that
of a private person.
40 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
1982]
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situations.
Feres involved allegations of governmental negligence in
quartering members of armed forces in barracks which were
known or which should have been known to be unsafe. When
the United States' involvement is in the nature of safety in-
spection and approval, there is no analogous "private person"
liability and thus, no actionable duty.4'
Since such a duty has never been recognized by the com-
mon law of any state, either, it cannot properly afford a basis
of liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Thus, absent a
recognized cause of action under state law for alleged negli-
gence in the conduct of regulatory inspection and certification
activities, which require as a threshold matter the existence of
a legal duty, there is no right of recovery from the United
States.42 In Clemente v. United States,5 the court held:
[E]ven where specific behavior of Federal employees is re-
quired by Federal statute, liability to the beneficiaries of that
statute may not be founded on the Federal Tort Claims Act if
state law recognizes no comparable private liability."4
The court in United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United
States45 stated that "pursuant to the [Federal Tort Claims]
Act, courts may not determine governmental liability without
41 Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 610 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1979)
(FDA approval of marketing certain anesthetic drug); McMann v. Northern Pueblos
Enter., Inc., 594 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1979) (posting of surety bond); Sellfors v. United
States, 16 Av. Cas. 17,186 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1980) (alleged negligence of FAA in
implementing safety precautions to mitigate danger presented by flocks of birds near
runway); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (safety inspec-
tion by OSHA of machinery of private employer).
" Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979) (issuance of permit by
Bureau of Land Management to hold motorcycle race on federal land); Harmsen v.
Smith, 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1978) (alleged negligence of comptroller of the currency
in conducting bank examinations); Builders Corp. of America v. United States, 320
F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964) (alleged failure of com-
manding officer to comply with obligations of government contract concerning dwell-
ings constructed by plaintiff adjacent to military installation); Kirk v. United States,
270 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1954) (Department of Army's jurisdiction over improvements
on rivers for flood control); Davis v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 793 (D. Neb. 1975)
(OSHA inspection of sewer project).
"' 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
44 Id. at 1149.
45 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
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considering the liability of a private person in 'like circum-
stances' pursuant to relevant state law. ' 4 The court reversed
and remanded this aircraft certification case, directing the
trial judge to determine which state's substantive law applied,
whether the state had adopted or would apply any form of the
Good Samaritan rule4 7 and if so, whether appellee's case satis-
fied the rule, as formulated by that state. The court then
concluded:
Should state law preclude liability against a private person who
undertakes an inspection on behalf of others, or if the Court
finds that the government's activity here would not allow a
finding that a duty relationship had been created ... the dis-
trict court judge must dismiss the action for failure to state a
claim pursuant to the Act.48
In the first lawsuit against the United States involving al-
leged negligent failure to enforce the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),4 ' the Government successfully
argued that, because no analagous private duties or liability
existed arising out of OSHA violations, there should be no
government liability. 50 In Davis v. United States5 ' a compli-
ance officer inspected a construction site pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
Although he discovered a safety violation, he failed to follow
up his discovery of the violation with the issuance of an "im-
minent danger" citation or by further inspections. The contin-
ued existence of the safety defect resulted in the loss of a life.
In an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the court ex-
amined the question of a duty running from the United States
to the decedent and held:
Two sources of duty arguably can be pointed to. One is the
common law of Nebraska; the other, the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (OSHA). How-
' Id. at 198.
' See infra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
614 F.2d at 198.
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
o Davis v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Neb. 1975).
395 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Neb. 1975).
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ever, the Federal Tort Claims Act specifically limits its applica-
tion to those instances in which "the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred" places liability upon the claimed
wrongdoer. Unless the law of Nebraska would declare liability
- including a duty - upon a private person in the same cir-
cumstances, no jurisdiction lies in this Court.
I find no indication that any law permits Nebraska to place
upon private persons the duty cast upon Federal officers to in-
vestigate, issue citations and apply for enforcement orders by
Federal Court. Nothing resembling those duties devolves on a
private person under OSHA.52
In Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.," the
plaintiffs alleged that the Food and Drug Administration
failed to insure that the drug manufacturer complied with ap-
plicable statutes and regulations regarding the drug Xylocaine
and that a duty of care arose under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act." The court stated that "federally imposed
obligations, whether general or specific, are irrelevant under
the FTCA, unless state law imposes a similar obligation upon
private persons."5 5 The court held that under the laws of Min-
nesota and the District of Columbia, no cause of action exists
against an individual for similar activity. There is no tort duty
imposed on private persons to perform activities analogous to
the granting or denial of licenses for drugs, and in the absence
of such duty, there can be no liability for negligence on the
part of the government. 6
IV. Is THE UNITED STATES A "GOOD SAMARITAN"?
Where "good samaritan" inspections are undertaken by the
federal government, courts have consistently denied liability.
They note that a "good samaritan" undertaking to inspect,
even if negligent, gives rise to liability only if the inspection:
(1) specifically engenders reliance; (2)constitutes the under-
82 Id. (emphasis added).
0 610 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1979).
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
610 F.2d at 562.
"Id.
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taking of a "duty" directly owed the employee; or (3) worsens
the position of the plaintiffs. 7
In order to fall within the purview of a "good samaritan"
theory, a plaintiff must typically demonstrate that under the
factual situation of the case, the "good samaritan" require-
ments of the Restatement Second of Torts" are satisfied. Sec-
tion 323 of the Restatement provides:
Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services.
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as neces-
sary for the protection of the other's person or things, is sub-
ject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from
failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking,
if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking."
First, it must be determined if there was an "undertaking"
on the part of the United States. Without the actual assump-
tion of the undertaking, there can be no correlative legal duty
to perform.60 Section 323 of the Restatement encompasses
those situations in which one person "undertakes to render a
service directly to another person" and these are the only two
parties involved. 1
The United States, by inspecting and certifying an aircraft
whose engine falls off, does not undertake to render a service
directly to the passenger, nor does it undertake a duty to in-
sure or guarantee the safety of the users of the aircraft.
Therefore, no liability can be imposed upon the United States
under Section 323 of the Restatement because no duty was
N Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1976); Tillman v, Trav-
elers Indem. Co., 506 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1975); Stacy v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
484 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A (1965).
" Id. § 323.
60 Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
" Roberson v. United States, 382 F.2d 714, 719-22 (9th Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added).
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breached.
A recent case, Kirkpatrick v. United States,62 supports the
United States' position that no liability can be imposed for
allegedly negligent inspection. The action was premised upon
the alleged negligent activities of United States' mine inspec-
tors who either failed to inspect or negligently inspected a
mine. The plaintiff asserted that the duty to her decedent was
established under the FTCA by the "good samaritan" doc-
trine. The United States undertook the responsibility to in-
spect the mine, negligently conducted the inspection, and
proximately caused the death of the decedent. In reviewing
the "good samaritan" doctrine, the court noted that there
must be a rendering of "services" directly to the person in-
jured, citing Section 323 of the Restatement. s The Federal
Coal Mine Act (like the Federal Aviation Act and others) re-
quires no direct services by the mine inspectors to the miners,
even though the miners may indirectly benefit from the
inspections.
The Kirkpatrick court denied recovery and concluded its
opinion by stating that:
[A]bsent any direct rendering of services by the government to
the person injured or to the employer, . . . [and] absent any
direct benefit to the making of the inspections and absent anyjudicially created duty upon government regulatory officials
acting to enforce regulatory statutes, there can be no claim
stated upon which relief can be granted."
Roberson v. United States" involved a suit against the
United States by workmen who were injured while engaged in
construction work at a federal dam project. The Ninth Circuit
found that the services rendered by the government, on which
the plaintiffs relied for a basis of liability, were those relating
to the government's safety inspection program. It further
found that there was no direct relationship between the gov-
ernment and the workmen concerning the performance of
No. 79-P-1106-J (N.D. Ala. March 19, 1980).
I /d.
Id., slip op. at 3.
382 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967).
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these services. The workmen occupied a third-person rela-
tionship, the government's direct relationship being with the
contractors. Therefore, the government did not undertake to
render safety services to the plaintiffs and Section 323 of the
Restatement had no application."
The Roberson court then turned to the second part of the
"good samaritan" doctrine, Section 324A of the Restatement,
involving liability to third persons. In order for liability to at-
tach or a duty to be found, the United States must undertake,
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
other, which the United States should recognize as necessary
for the protection of the third person (the plaintiffs), and
must fail to exercise reasonable care in the performance of
this undertaking. The court concluded that:
As in the case of the two-person facet of the Good Samaritan
doctrine,. . . the first essential element in establishing liability
under the third person branch of the doctrine is here missing.
In conducting its safety inspection program, the Government
was not undertaking to render services to the contractor....
[T]he safety inspection activities of the Government did not
relieve the contractor of any of its contractual duties; quite to
the contrary, it was designed only to make sure the contractor
performed those duties.
7
In United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States," the
court distinguished inspection cases as "merely supplementing
another's primary duty," unlike those cases in which one un-
dertakes a primary duty to accomplish another's
responsibility.
Although such functions (inspecting privately owned aircraft)
are carried out pursuant to statute or to regulations, they do
not arise from a primary duty to provide the service in ques-
tion. Thus, not only would there be no potential liability if the
government declined to provide such services at all, but the
government does not purport to relieve other actors of the pri-
mary duty to see that the underlying activity is accomplished
"' Id. at 721.
67 Id.
614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
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safely or consistently. . . . If such undertaking automatically
created a cause of action for negligent performance, the gov-
ernment might be less inclined to assume such tasks in
future.9
The Ninth Circuit in United Scottish Insurance Co. makes it
clear that the manufacturers, owners and operators of aircraft
have the primary duty to inspect the aircraft and to insure its
safety.
Assuming that there is an "undertaking" on the part of the
United States under Section 323 of the Restatement, the fol-
lowing requirements must be satisfied by the courts:
(a) the inspection and certification must increase the risk
of harm to plaintiffs; or
(b) the plaintiffs must actually rely on the inspection and
certification and that reliance must cause the injury.70
If it is assumed that the United States negligently inspects
and certifies an aircraft, it must then be established, in order
to meet the requirements of Section 323 of the Restatement,
that the inspection and certification by the FAA increased the
risk of harm to the user of the aircraft or in some positive way
contributed to the injury by inducing reliance on its certifica-
tion and inspection.7 1
While the typical action or inaction of a government inspec-
tor prior to an injury may not improve matters, neither do
they usually worsen them. Federal inspections of products
simply do not physically increase the risk of harm to users of
that product or service. The Fifth Circuit in United States v.
De Vane,"7 held that under the "good samaritan" doctrine, the
government's negligence in rescuing an innocent victim whose
fishing boat had sunk in a storm was not actionable when the
negligence did not worsen the victim's plight.73
A person who voluntarily undertakes to aid another, absent
69 Id. at 193 (emphasis added). See Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140,
1150-51 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Blessing v. United States,
447 F. Supp. 1160, 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
70 United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 194 (9th Cir. 1979).
71 Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
71 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962).
73 Accord Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1951)..
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a duty to do so, assumes only a duty to avoid making the situ-
ation worse than it was prior to his undertaking. He does not
become legally bound to successfully complete the rescue, but
only to avoid causing harm by his attempt.7 4 Similarly, the
United States, by undertaking to regulate the manufacturers
and to require minimum standards, does not thereby become
obligated to insure each member of the public against injury
in the event of a product defect.
Turning now to Section 324A of the Restatement, a number
of federal courts have examined situations in which a defen-
dant is sued because its inspectors failed to discover, prevent
or correct the negligence of another. In such cases, courts tend
to rely upon the principles of Restatement Section 324A to
determine the duty issue. 5 In order for a plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case under Restatement Section 324A, and
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, it must be established that a "good samari-
tan" duty arose because: (1) the inspection and certification
increased the risk of harm; or (2) the government undertook
to perform a duty owed by another to the plaintiff; or (3) the
plaintiff actually relied on the conduct of the government and
that reliance caused the injury.
Under the increased risk of harm concept of Section
324A(a), it is clear that the federal government's inspection
and certification of a product which is manufactured and
tested by another would not typically increase the risk of
14 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 343 (4th ed. 1971).
7' Section 324A of the Restatement provides:
Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render ser-
vices to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protec-
tion of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third
person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasona-
ble care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the
third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
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harm to the user. The language of the Restatement estab-
lishes that, to trigger liability under Section 324A(b), more is
required than a limited functional congruence of inspections
or certifications. In cases brought under the FTCA involving
inspection activities, where the principles of Section 324A of
the Restatement have been applied, the government has been
exonerated from liability."
V. GOVERNMENTAL DISCRETION Is NOT ACTIONABLE
The "discretionary function exception" to the Federal Tort
Claims Act bars:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat-
ute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
The judgmental discretion inherent in inspection and li-
censing actions by government agencies stands out as a classic
illustration of the type of "disCretionary function," even if
abused, which Congress sought to place beyond the pale of
judicial scrutiny by the court in tort litigation. That the words
"discretionary function" encompass the function of regulation
is hardly open to question, even apart from the legislative his-
tory of the exception. These words have long been familiar to
the law. As used in the Act, they express "a concept of sub-
stantial historical ancestry in American law.' 8 Congress de-
liberately chose them "with the intent that they should con-
vey the same meaning traditionally accorded [them] by the
Courts. ' '79
The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1946 after
some twenty-seven (27) different bills dealing with tort claims
76 See, e.g., Mercer v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (mine
safety inspection by federal inspectors).
77 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
78 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
71 Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
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had been introduced in Congress since 1923.80 But while Con-
gress was intent on making the United States subject to suit
for the "ordinary common law torts," such as are involved in
automobile accidents, it was the consistent view of Congress
that suit should not be permitted on claims stemming from
the performance of important governmental regulatory
functions."s
Accordingly, many of the earlier tort claim bills had excep-
tions relating to specifically designated spheres of regulatory
activity. There were, for instance, provisions exempting claims
arising from the activities of the Federal Trade Commission
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 Exceptions of
this kind, involving regulatory activities of the specific agen-
cies, were included in the tort claims bill which was intro-
duced in the 77th Congress. 8 While that bill was under con-
sideration, however, these specific exceptions were deleted
and the more general language of the discretionary function
exception, as it now appears, was substituted, in order "to in-
sure that regulatory activity by any administrative agency
would be exempt from liability."84
A committee memorandum" explaining the revisions stated
that the substituted provision was "designed to preclude...
application of the act to a claim against a regulatory
agency. . . . Since the language used . . . exempts from the
act claims against federal agencies growing out of their regula-
so For a discussion of legislative history behind FTCA, see United States v. Spelar,
338 U.S. 217, 219-21 nn.6-9 (1949).
" See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945); S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942); 86 CONG.
REC. 12,021-22 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1940); H.R. Rm. No. 2800, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 13
(1930); Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 77th Cong., 2d Seass. 28, 33, 38, 45, 65-66 (1941).
82 See H.R. 5299, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(7) (1941); S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st
Seass. § 303(7) (1939).
83 H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 303 (1942), stated "[t]he meaning of the gov-
ernmental regulatory function exception from suits, Section 2680(a), shows most
clearly in the history of the Tort Claims Bill in the Seventy-seventh Congress."
In re Franklin Nat'l Bank, 478 F. Supp. 210, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (emphasis
added).
85 See Memorandum for the Use of the Committee of the Judiciary, H.R. 5373,
77th Cong., 2d Seass. 8 (January 1942), noted in Weinstein v. United States, 244 F.2d
68, 71 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957).
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tory activities it is not necessary expressly to except such
agencies ... by name .... "86 The Congressional committee
reporting on the bills which ultimately became the Act stated
time and again that, although the Act was intended to permit
suit for claims arising from the ordinary common law torts in-
volving vehicles of employees of regulatory agencies, the Act
was designed to preclude claims based upon the regulatory ac-
tivities of those agencies. 87
Consistent with the legislative purpose, the words "discre-
tionary function exception" have been construed by courts as
barring claims based upon regulatory activity.88 The Supreme
Court's decision in Dalehite v. United States89 is the leading
decision on the interpretation and application of the discre-
tionary function exception. Dalehite arose out of a series of
explosions that leveled the port area of Texas City, Texas,
killing and injuring many persons. The government had been
involved in a post-war fertilizer export program to the de-
feated nations. The fertilizer at issue, Fertilizer Grade Ammo-
nium Nitrate (FGAN), contained a basic ingredient long used
as a component in explosives. The government manufactured
the fertilizer at fifteen deactivated ordnance plants, with the
Army's Chief of Ordnance carrying out the manufacturing
plan. 0 The FGAN contained a coating subject to oxidation,
was bagged at a high temperature in easily ignitable paper
containers, and, as labeled, did not contain a warning of po-
tential hazards. Longshoremen loaded the bags adjacent to a
cargo of explosives aboard two French steamers. A fire broke
out within the fertilizer and both ships exploded.
The Supreme Court held that the claims brought under the
FTCA against the United States arising out of the explosions
88 Weinstein v. United States, 244 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868
(1957) (quoting Memorandum for the Use of the Committee of the Judiciary, H.R.
5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (January 1942)). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 27-30 (1953), and the Committee Reports cited and quoted therein.
87 Id.
" See cases cited infra in note 107.
88 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
0 Id.
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were barred by the discretionary function exception." After
reviewing the legislative history of the discretionary function
exception, the Court concluded that Congress did not contem-
plate that the "Government should be subject to liability aris-
ing from acts of a governmental nature or function." 9 Dis-
cussing the scope and meaning of section 2680(a), the Court
stated that it extends to "all employees exercising discre-
tion;" 98 that the discretion referred to includes "the discretion
of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's
judgment of the best course;"" and that "[w]here there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion."'
Turning to the specific issues before it, the Court in
Dalehite concluded that all of the following decisions were
protected by the exception: (1) the cabinet-level decision to
institute the FGAN program; (2) the need for further experi-
mentation with FGAN to determine the possibility of explo-
sion; (3) the drafting of the basic plan of manufacture, includ-
ing the decision regarding the coating, bagging temperature,
and bagging materials; and (4) the failure to properly police
the storage and loading of FGAN." These holdings were not
intended to exclude other types of discretion which the ex-
emption might embrace, for the court said that "[i]t is unnec-
essary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discre-
tion ends. '9 7
It is significant that there has been no decision by the Su-
preme Court since Dalehite which has, in any way, modified
these views as to this aspect of the discretionary function ex-
ception. Indian Towing Co. v. United States,98 involving the
negligent operation of a lighthouse, did not, as the Court itself
noted, present any question as to the discretionary function
exception. It dealt instead with the interpretation of section
', Id. at 43.
, Id. at 28.
93 Id. at 33.
" Id. at 34.
91 Id. at 36.
" Id. at 39-42.
9 Id. at 35.
" 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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2674 of the Act." Consistent with the intent of Congress to
exclude claims predicated on Government regulatory activi-
ties, lower courts have repeatedly upheld the viability of the
exception as a bar to tort suits seeking to second-guess the
discretionary or judgmental decisions of Federal officials who
have exercised, or refrained from exercising, their statutory
regulatory powers.100
In a recent certification case, Garbarino v. United States101
the court granted the United States' motion for summary
judgment based upon the discretionary function exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act. The cause of action arose from
the crash of a Cessna 177 aircraft at Detroit City Airport in
June, 1975.102 It was alleged that the FAA negligently certified
the aircraft as airworthy, failed to promulgate "crashworthi-
ness" regulations which arguably would have detected a de-
sign defect in the fuel tank assembly, failed to promulgate an
airworthiness directive to correct the "design" problems, and
negligently tested and inspected the aircraft.'0 '
The court dismissed all counts against the United States. In
dismissing the action, the court found that the alleged negli-
gent certification and failure to issue an airworthiness direc-
tive fell within the discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, expressly excluding the government
from liability.1'0 The negligent testing and inspection argu-
ments were held to be barred by the misrepresentation excep-
tion'05 to the Federal Tort Claims Act.1' 6 Similarly, in other
inspection and licensing cases, the courts have uniformly held
that such regulatory functions in the products area are barred
by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
'00 Martin v. United States, 546 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
906 (1977); Rubenstein v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488
F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973).
o' Civil No. 87-1375 (E.D. Mich., January 31, 1980).
'0' Id., slip op. at 1.
103 Id.
104 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
:1 See infra notes 111-27 and accompanying text.
100 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
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Claims Act. 07
Griffin v. United States0 8 is a case which is often cited for
the proposition that the discretionary function exception does
not bar recovery against the United States in the products
area. In Griffin, the Federal Government injected itself di-
rectly into the manufacturing process by actually testing and
approving batches of polio vaccine, as distinguished from at-
tempting to insure a manufacturer's compliance with set stan-
dards. The government did not merely regulate, it actually
tested and purposely released the defective vaccine.10'9
Similar drug cases since Griffin have found no liability on
the part of the United States for testing and approving drugs,
based upon the discretionary function exception to the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act.'"0 This represents the better view be-
cause, if courts are permitted to penetrate the cloak of protec-
tion afforded by the discretionary function exception and
award money damages in products' liability suits against the
government by asserting negligent inspection and certifica-
tion, the United States will become the insurer of all who en-
gage in manufacturing. Such a situation was certainly not
within the contemplation of the Congress at the time of enact-
ing the FTCA.
VI. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
Among the exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which limit the jurisdiction of the courts, is the following:
"The provisions of the Chapter in Section 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to - any claim arising out misrepresentation
,07 Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
1482 (1981); Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 610 F.2d 558 (8th Cir.
1979); Lawrence v. United States, 381 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Mor-
rell, 331 F.2d 498 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); In re Franklin Nat'l
Bank Securities Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Gray v. United States,
445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Silver Plume, Colo-
rado, 445 F. Supp. 384 (D. Kan. 1977).
-- 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
109 Id. at 1067.
"0 See, e.g., Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 610 F.2d 558 (8th Cir.
1979); Grey v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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.... "Is The leading case on the "misrepresentation excep-
tion" is United States v. Neustadt. 2 In Neustadt, the
United States was sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act by
the purchaser of a home, who claimed he relied upon a negli-
gent inspection and appraisal by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration and was induced to pay more for the property than it
was worth. The Supreme Court held that the misrepresenta-
tion exclusion under section 2680(h) barred recovery since it
applied to negligent as well as intentional misrepresen-
tations.113
The Neustadt Court made it abundantly clear that section
2680(h) cannot be circumvented by stating that the gist of the
claim lies in "negligence" rather than in "misrepresentation."
Congress simply did not intend to subject the United States
to liability for its licensing activities under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 114
While some parties have attempted to limit the misrepre-
sentation exception to the context of business and common
civil dealings, case law and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 311, support the principle that the misrepresen-
tation exception is just as applicable to actions involving in-
jury, wrongful death and property damages as it is to those
actions involving only financial or commercial loss.115 In Lloyd
v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,11 the third-party plaintiff, Cessna Air-
craft Co., alleged negligence on the part of the Federal Avia-
... 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1981).
112 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
11 Id. at 702.
.. See also Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
866 (1975) (induction into armed forces); United States v. Croft-Mullins Elec. Co.,
333 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965) (government contract
requiring government to furnish certain construction materials); Hall v. United
States, 274 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir. 1959) (testing of cattle for disease by Department of
Agriculture); Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 242 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir. 1957) (sampling of tomato paste by Food and Drug Administration).
"' Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866
(1975); Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954); Summers v. United
States, 480 F. Supp. 347 (D. Md. 1979); Castro v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 959
(D.P.R. 1978); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977);
Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
"1 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
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tion Administration in inspecting and testing an aircraft prior
to the agency's issuance of a supplemental type certificate and
an airworthiness certificate.'"7 The court dismissed Cessna's
third-party claim, relying on the misrepresentation excep-
tion." '8 In its Memorandum Opinion, the district court stated:
In several cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act,...
the Courts have held that negligent inspections and testing by
Government officials, which conduct results in incorrect infor-
mation being reported and relied upon, in reality amount to a
claim arising out of misrepresentation so as to be precluded by
the [misrepresentation] exception to the [Federal Tort Claims
Act]." 9
The court continued:
Where the negligence of Federal Employees, whether by in-
spection, testing, diagnosis or otherwise, has resulted in the
conveyance of erroneous information, thereby causing damages
or other loss to the plaintiff, the Courts have held that any
action against a national sovereign based on the Federal Tort
Claims Act, . . . is barred by the misrepresentation
exception.'"
Furthermore, the court stated that "the misrepresentation ex-
ception is just as applicable to actions involving injury, wrong-
ful death or property damages as it is to those involving only
financial or commercial loss."''
Another case in which a court applied the misrepresenta-
tion exception to claims of negligent licensing which resulted
in property loss or personal injury is Marival, Inc. v. Planes,
Inc.12 In Marival, an airplane purchaser brought an action to
recover damages from the defendant seller because of the lat-
ter's misrepresentation and breach of implied warranties. The
defendant filed a third-party action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act on the theory that the
7 Id. at 182.
,". Id. at 183.
119 Id.
'2 Id. at 185.
121 Id. at 187.
"1 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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FAA had negligently renewed an airworthiness certificate for
such aircraft, upon which the defendant had relied.1 2 The de-
fendant and third-party plaintiff's contention was that, if the
aircraft was not airworthy, the government's authorized in-
spector negligently performed his annual inspection, thereby
rendering the FAA negligent in the certification of the air-
craft's airworthiness. The Marival court never decided the is-
sue of whether an inspection performed by a person not em-
ployed by the FAA, although an authorized inspector, could
result in FAA liability for erroneous certification. However,
the court stated in dicta that certification by the FAA was
"not designed as a commercial warranty upon which a party
may sue the Government."'12'
The reasoning of the Marival court is understandable. To
the extent, that a claim against the Federal Government for
negligent inspection or approval, failure to issue a license or
negligent certification, states any kind of tort at all, it plainly
states one for misrepresentation."2 " Such a complaint, however
artfully drafted, cannot help but state a claim sounding in
misrepresentation.12  The misrepresentation exception is no
mere technicality. The underlying allegation in such cases is
that the government may be held liable, not for engaging in
conduct itself which caused damage, but for giving its stamp
of approval or certification to a product which allegedly there-
after caused damage. Were such an allegation to create a tria-
ble issue of fact, the consequences would be onerous indeed.
Virtually every tortious act or omission by a private person
is committed under the aegis of some license, certificate, per-
mit or other approval granted by the federal, state or local
government. Every pilot, automobile driver, doctor, merchant,
manufacturer, attorney or building contractor cannot legally
act but for a license or other stamp of approval given to his
' Id. at 857.
", Id. at 860 n.1.
", See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311, Illustration 8 (1957).
" Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959), cited with approval in
United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961). See also Anglo-American & Overseas
Corp. v. United States, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 426
F. Supp. 127 (D. Minn 1976).
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actions by the Federal, State or local government. Even to
find that there exists an issue of fact in each such case would
effectively make some branch of government a party defen-
dant in virtually every tort suit arising out of the negligent
conduct of every private person. Congress did not intend such
a result.
Where the involvement of the United States is in testing,
inspection or certification, notwithstanding the product liabil-
ity overtones, the misrepresentation exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act has been and is a complete defense, preclud-
ing liability.1 7
VII. CONCLUSION
Within the context of products liability law, as it has been
and is developing, it seems clear that the waiver of sovereign
immunity permitting suits against the United States has con-
sistently been interpreted as excluding this area. Such a judi-
cial conclusion appears overwhelmingly consistent with the in-
tent of the Congress. The role of the federal government in
the products area is, absent unusual circumstances, one which
is uniquely governmental in nature and is not meant to alter
or supplant theories of liability against manufacturers and
purveyors of goods and services.
127 Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866
(1975); Rey v. United States, 484 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Silver Bridge Disaster
Litigation, 381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. W.Va. 1974); Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 306 F.
Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969); United States v. Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Ark.
1967); Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Miss. 1966); Bartie v. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963), affd 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1964). See also
Garbarino v. United States, No. 87-1375 (E.D. Mich. January 31, 1980); Federal Ex-
press Corp. v. United States, No. 76-0434 (D.R.I. March 11, 1980); Summers v.
United States, 480 F. Supp. 347 (D. Md. 1979); Hawkins v. United States, No. G75-
132 (W.D. Mich., June 25, 1978).
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